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TIM FOWLER
PUBLIC REASON, SCIENCE AND FAITH: THE CASE
OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN
(Accepted 16 April 2018)
ABSTRACT. This article considers the justification of laws to religious citizens. It
does via a consideration of the debate surround the teaching of Intelligent Design.
It argues that one widely held view of political morality, public reason liberalism,
requires that schools should allow teaching ID. This is contrary to the views of
many defenders of this theory. I show that this argument reveals a deep problem
with public reason liberalism, and that it undermines the judgement of the court in
the high profile case of Kitzmiller vs Dover.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses whether public schools should be permitted, or
perhaps required, to teach intelligent design (ID) alongside main-
stream Darwinian theory (DT). More specifically, I revisit the
question posed by Thomas Nagel:
What would a biology class teach if it wanted to remain neutral on the question of whether
divine intervention in the process of life’s development was a possibility, while acknowledging
that people disagree about whether it should be regarded as a possibility at all, or what prob-
ability should be assigned to it…?.1
Nagel argues that a properly neutral education system must include
the teaching of ID; he believes exclusively teaching DT represents a
bias towards a controversial naturalistic viewpoint. Nagel’s discus-
sion was extremely controversial and heavily criticised online.2 Many
theorists believe it is implausible that a widely held liberal principle
requires teaching ID; Brian Barry writes:
1 Thomas Nagel, ‘Public Education and Intelligent Design’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 36, no. 2
(2008), p. 201.
2 See, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/12/thomas-nagel-jumps-the-shark.html.
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Absurd or not, the notion of neutrality has been invoked by the partisans of so-called ‘creationist
science’ in the United States to argue that the Darwinian theory of evolution should be taught as
a mere hypothesis and forced to share equal time with the theory that the species was created in
a succession by God. On the same basis it might well be urged that the National Science
Foundation’s budget for astronomy should be split in two, with half going to astrology. For the
purposes of both teaching and research, the consensus of the scientific community is precisely
what government within a neutral constitutional system should defer to.3
In this passage Barry expresses a view I term ‘Neutral Prohibition’
(NP). NP is the position that i) the state must be neutral on
metaphysical and theological questions, but nevertheless ii) there are
sufficient reasons to prohibit the teaching of ID. In this paper, I
mount a series of arguments against NP. My aim is emphatically not
to justify teaching ID. I am personally convinced that Darwin should
be the basis of the school curriculum. My question is whether there
are good grounds to prohibit ID while following principles of
neutrality. Given that there are numerous different interpretations of
this principle, I focus on the most sophisticated view that might offer
support to NP, known as consensus public reason liberalism.
Education policy is a fruitful place to explore question of neu-
trality and public justification. Steven Macedo writes that debates
over religious accommodation and liberal neutrality have played out
most ‘dramatically’ in the educational arena.4 In education, the aim
of many philosophers and lawyers is to be as inclusive as possible, at
least amongst reasonable doctrines. Sometimes this aim conflicts
with another valuable goal of education, namely teaching children
the best available theories about how the world works, those most
likely to be true. In this paper, I show that the conflict between these
two aims is deep and that leading attempts to diffuse this tension fail.
While the issue of ID might seem somewhat narrow (although it
is worth keeping in mind that it is one that affects many children’s
lives in a profound way), this paper raises questions that apply more
widely to education policy, parental rights and many other matters.
My arguments will suggest that much of the recent theoretical
treatment of religious pluralism fails to take seriously the nature and
scope of disagreement. Important as practices and values are to
many believers, religious pluralism is about more than this. Rather,
sometimes religious believers also have fundamentally different
3 Brian Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice Vol 2: Justice as Impartiality, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), p. 161f.
4 Steven Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 39.
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views about how the world works and the nature of causation. ID is
a good case to explore this aspect of pluralism, since some people
believe that life’s creation depends upon supernatural processes,
whereas others believe that there is (and perhaps could be no) evi-
dence for such processes and that a belief in them is irrational.
Through a discussion of ID, this paper explores the status of science
in liberal theory, and I show that the scientific method is itself the
object of deep controversy in a way that matters for prominent
liberal theories. Finally, the paper explores the nature and implica-
tions of public reason, which is one of the central principles in many
contemporary views of liberal justice with broad applications to
many aspects of law and policy.
II. BACKGROUND: INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Proponents of ID believe that the best available explanation of the
existence of life is that an external actor directed the creation of
living organisms. While technically this actor need not be God, it is
assumed to be in most discussions of ID. As such, ID is often thought
of as a modern formulation of the theory of Creationism.5 Young
Earth creationists believe in the literal truth of the biblical story of
creation, and hold that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old.6 Given
U.S. legal precedent, it is sometimes important to ask whether ID is
really creationism in a new guise. However, none of my own
argument turn on the possible differences between ID and cre-
ationism. Estimates vary on the number of people who believe in
either Creationism or ID. The precise figure is irrelevant for my
argument, but it’s important to note that ID is far from a ‘fringe’
view. A recent Pew survey found that 38 percent of U.S. citizens
believe that ‘God created man in his present form’, with large
numbers of other people believing that God played a direct part in
creation.7
Numerous trials in the U.S. have investigated the legality of public
schools teaching ID or creationism. The most recent is Kitzmiller v.
Dover in which the court ruled that public schools could not teach ID
5 See, for instance, http://slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2005/05/creationism_
vs_intelligent_design.html.
6 Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
7 http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/10/darwin-day/.
PUBLIC REASON, SCIENCE AND FAITH
as an alternative to Darwinian Theory (DT). The judges in Kitzmiller
found that teaching ID would violate the Constitution since it would
constitute an official state endorsement of religious doctrine. In its
judgement, the court went to great lengths to suggest that its
decision was not based on a belief about the relative merits of ID
versus DT as an explanation of natural events. The presiding judge
argued that the truth or falsity of ID was ‘a proposition on which the
court took no position’.8
Because of this claim by the court, the judgment can be consid-
ered an instance of NP. Further, the fact that the judgment is suitably
neutral plays an important role in justifying the use of coercive
power on parents. Note that the court cited the Supreme Court’s
statement that: ‘Families entrust public schools with the education of
their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the
classroom will not purposefully be used to advance religious views
that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or
her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their
attendance is involuntary’.9 Thus while philosophical discussions of
neutrality are not directly relevant to the legal reasoning of the case,
questions about what constitutes neutrality are highly relevant to
determining whether the law is properly justified to citizens of faith.
The court here concedes that if it were true that DT conflicted with
the private religious views of some citizens, this would be prob-
lematic. However, they believed this was not the case. As I discuss
later in the paper, the court found that there was no deep tension
between religious belief and a belief in evolution, because many
scientists and others reconcile the two. In response, I will argue that
while some religious views are of course compatible with evolution,
the parents can fairly argue that their religious views are not. I will
use this to show that such parents can make a reasonable objection
to a Darwin-only curriculum. In this discussion and elsewhere I
demonstrate how some of the critiques I make against liberal the-
orists also apply to arguments made in Kitzmiller. This shows how
these arguments indicate general concerns with NP, and shows the
practical importance of the more technical discussions of neutrality.
8 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 64 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
9 Kitzmiller, p. 36.
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III. FOUR POSSIBLE VIEWS ABOUT ID
This paper considers two issues, whether the state should be neutral
and whether the state should permit the teaching of ID using public
funds. This sets up four possible views.
1. Neutral Prohibition (NP) Yes to neutrality, no to ID
2. Neutral Accommodation (NA) Yes to neutrality, yes to ID
3. Comprehensive Accommodation (CA) No to neutrality, yes to ID
4. Comprehensive Prohibition (CP) No to neutrality, no to ID.
It is worth noting that these labels each include a wide set of possible
positions. In particular, there is ambiguity on what is meant by
accommodation. I use this to refer the belief that public funds can
permissibly support the teaching of ID. This would include teaching
ID in publicly controlled schools, or vouchers used to subsidise
religious schools teaching ID. This definition creates a further
ambiguity in the case of home-schooling. On my terminology,
someone who supports the possibility of home-schooling ID but
believes it should be banned in schools would not be accommo-
dating the practice. Some might suggest that allowing home-
schooling makes school system teaching DT much more justifiable,
because religious parents have the option of removing their children
from this system. However, Kevin Vallier notes a serious problem
which is that the religious parents are paying both for the school
system and for their own religious schooling (either in money or in
time spent teaching).10 This sets up a serious distributive unfairness,
which would only be justified if there were a good reason to treat ID
differently from DT. But of course, it is precisely this question which
is at issue. I therefore believe that if believers in ID can reasonably
object to a curriculum teaching only DT without home-schooling,
then the addition of this alternative will not be sufficient to assuage
their objections. In this paper, I show why neutrality commits the
state to accommodation that goes beyond allowing home-schooling,
and includes state funded support of ID.
Of the four alternatives, by far the least influential is CA. This
position describes the belief that the state ought to be constructed on
religious grounds and teach ID for theological reasons. Since this
10 Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge 2014), p.
243.
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view is not part of liberal discourse I will not discuss it further. Each
of the other three positions finds support in the philosophical liter-
ature. In the next section I give examples of theorists who defend
each of NA and NP from the perspective of public reason liberalism
(PRL). The final position, CP, is that favoured by ‘liberal perfec-
tionists’ who deny the requirement to be neutral and who draw on
comprehensive reasons to object to ID. While there are many pos-
sible comprehensive objections to ID, the most powerful is the
interests of the child. A perfectionist should think that children have
a powerful interest in learning the best available theories at school,
and most experts believe ID to be a much worse explanation of the
existence of life than DT.
By showing NP fails (at least on the best available theories of
neutrality) the paper leaves liberals with the choice of either CP or
NA. Opting for NA means joining Nagel in the belief that schools
should teach ID because of the requirement to be properly neutral.
Alternatively, liberals who resist teaching ID should admit that they
do so because of scepticism about the merits of ID as an explanation
of life. My own personal view is that CP is the correct choice, but I
do not defend that claim in this paper. Given the generality of these
labels, the paper does not defend any particular policy response to
ID. This paper only shows why NP fails and thereby clarifies which
options remain on the table. I show that the policy of prohibiting all
public teaching of ID as required by Kitzmiller is not justified in a way
consistent with neutrality.
IV. UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY: PUBLIC REASON
Following the publication of Rawls’ Political Liberalism, a number of
theorists have argued that the state must be neutral between what
Rawls termed comprehensive doctrines, paradigmatically religious
belief systems. To meet this requirement the state must offer justi-
fications for its law that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens. The
justifications are known as public reasons.
Recent years have seen a significant debate within PRL between
what are known as the ‘convergence’ and ‘consensus’ variants of
PRL. Consensus PRL holds that political justification requires that
laws are justified through one set of shared reasons. These reasons
are appropriately public because all reasonable citizens can appreci-
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ate their force.11 Convergence liberalism also requires that each law
is justified to each citizen according to reasons she can accept, but on
this view the reasons used may differ from person to person.12 This
difference is highly important in the case of religious reasons. On the
consensus view, religious views are ruled out because they cannot be
shared by all citizens. In contrast, convergence liberalism permits
religious justifications so long as the law can be justified to all per-
sons, including atheists, in terms they can accept. A policy might be
justified to a religious citizen in explicitly religious terms but to a
secular citizen in a different way.
This more accommodating approach to religious citizens is seen
in education policy. Most prominently, convergence liberal Kevin
Vallier defends a school choice system on which, ‘Parents are free to
purchase educational services in an open and competitive education
market’.13 ID is the example he uses to build his case against com-
mon schooling. He argues that some parents will have conclusive
reasons to defeat the teaching of ID, but also that some parents have
conclusive reasons that defeat teaching only DT. The result is that no
common curriculum can be justified to all parents, and the only
acceptable solution is to allow different parents to opt for radically
different curricula.14
In my terminology, Vallier (and likely other convergence PRLs)
favours NA. His argument can be understood as showing why the
best understanding of neutrality leads to allowing believers in ID to
have a school system that accommodates their beliefs. Given that
convergence liberals like Vallier do not hold NP, they are not the
target of this paper. Instead my arguments offer support to his
position because I believe Vallier’s view represents a coherent way of
meeting the neutrality requirement with respect to ID.
11 Consensus PRL is advanced in Jonathan Quong, Steven Lecce and Matthew Clayton amongst
others. See Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Steven
Lecce, Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2008).
Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). While
there is some debate about Rawls view, I think he can also be characterised in this way.
12 The most influential defender of the convergence view is Gerald Gaus. See The Order of Public
Reason: A theory of freedom and morality in a morally diverse world, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), and Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
13 Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith, p. 244.
14 Ibid., pp. 241–242.
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V. OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL ARGUMENT
The central argument of the paper is to show that a policy of
teaching only DT (and thus excluding ID) cannot be justified by PRL.
Specifically, if even consensus PRL requires teaching ID then it fol-
lows the most prominent contemporary accounts of liberal neu-
trality require accommodating ID rather than prohibiting it. This
supports my core claim that prohibiting ID requires violating the
principle of liberal neutrality.
The steps of my argument are as follows:
1. To be justified in terms of public reason, a law must be justified to all
reasonable citizens in terms they could not reasonably reject (liberal
principle of legitimacy).15
2. Some citizens who believe in ID are reasonable in the relevant sense.
3. Citizens can reasonably reject a law that cannot be justified except by
reference to the falsity/implausibility of their comprehensive doctrines.
4. ID is a constitutive element of some comprehensive doctrines
5. Teaching only DT requires asserting the falsity/implausibility of ID.
Ergo
6. Teaching only DT can be reasonably rejected by some reasonable
citizens. Ergo
7. Teaching only DT cannot be justified in terms of public reason.
Premises 1 and 3 are familiar elements of the consensus PRL view
(and political liberalism more generally), and I will simply assume
them to be true given that my aim is to show an implication of this
view. I will therefore focus on defending premises 2, 4 and 5.
A. Premise 2: Can There be a Reasonable Believer in ID?
In this section I argue that there can be a believer in ID who counts
as reasonable in the relevant sense. The implication is that they
count as part of the justificatory community, the set of people to
whom laws must be justified. If believers in ID were not reasonable
15 This formulation might seem to suggest that the test of legitimacy applied to all laws, whereas
Rawls believed it applied only to constitutional essentials. In response I would note that the issue of ID
concerns deep questions about what constitutes promoting a religious view, and thus I think would
count as a constitutional essential. Further, note that Jonathan Quong argues for a broader view, in
which the test applies to all uses of public power, see his ‘The Scope of Public Reason’, Political Studies,
52 (2004), pp. 233–245, p. 233.
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the state could reject their complaints without imperilling its legiti-
macy. To say that there can be a reasonable believer in ID might
seem surprising, since there are good grounds to think ID is an
implausible belief. However, while I agree that ID is a faulty theory,
I will show that there can still be a reasonable believer in ID in the
relevant sense for PRL.
To do this, I distinguish two aspects of the views of religious
believers in ID. First, there is the core religious belief in an activist
God. Second, there are the connected beliefs about evolution. An
activist God is the kind believed in by people who believe in mira-
cles, a God who intervenes directly and often in the world. Here I
show PRLs must consider a belief in this kind of God to be rea-
sonable. In the following section, I show that a belief in ID is a
reasonable conclusion given the commitment to an activist God. It
will follow that if PRLs grant that the core religious beliefs are
reasonable, then the views about science are reasonable as well.
To understand why a belief in an activist God is reasonable in the
requisite sense, it is useful to refer to a distinction drawn by Erin
Kelly and Lionel McPherson. They distinguish two senses of the
reasonable; the political and the epistemic.16 Politically reasonable
citizens recognise the burdens of judgement (meaning they accept
that other citizens will reasonably disagree with them) and endorse
basic liberal right. Epistemic reasonableness refers to the objective
plausibility of the beliefs of the person in question. Some theorists
such as Fabienne Peter have offered variants of PRL which rely
strongly on the epistemic component.17 On Peter’s account, the state
is under an obligation to remain neutral between various views
which are plausible enough to be counted as reasonable, but does
not act wrongly when it denies the truth of implausible and hence
unreasonable beliefs.
What are we to make of the claim that a belief in an activist God
is epistemically reasonable? Clearly, this is a question well beyond the
scope of this paper. Some philosophers have offered accounts on
which a belief in God is a justified one.18 Others have suggested
16 Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, ‘On Tolerating the Unreasonable’, Journal of Political Philosophy
9, no. 1 (2001).
17 Fabienne Peter, ‘Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, no.
5 (2013), 598–620.
18 See John Haldane, Reasonable Faith, (London: Routledge, 2004).
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many religious beliefs are not reasonable.19 Fortunately, we do not
need resolve this issue to determine whether a belief in an activist
God is reasonable in the requisite sense. This is because views like
Peters’ cannot possibly offer support to NP. NP means a prohibition
on teaching ID while remaining neutral on questions like whether
there is a God at all or whether He was active in the creation of life.
The epistemic strategy, while a public reason view, does the exact
opposite. This approach might well rule out teaching ID, but it will
do so precisely because it counts ID as implausible.
In contrast to Peter, the PRLs who are the target of this paper
define the reasonable in terms of the political, not the epistemic.
There are good grounds for doing this given their ecumenical aims, a
concern with the epistemic strategy is that it will rule out far too
many beliefs. Many citizens hold beliefs which are poorly justified or
somewhat inconsistent. The very same reasons that might lead to a
rejection of an intelligent designer also provide reasons to reject
beliefs which are fundamental to many religious doctrines, such as
reincarnation or resurrection. This is a very important point in the
ethical treatment of views like creationism (here I use this term
because creationism is more directly opposed to the scientific
method). While it’s true that creationism challenges a very impor-
tant part of contemporary science more directly than most religious
views, many religious believers hold empirical beliefs that are not
plausibly justified according to the scientific method. Ruling all views
not justified by the scientific method as unreasonable thus comes at a
very heavy cost, since for many theorists, the attraction of liberal
neutrality was that the state’s policies would be justifiable to all
citizens. The epistemic strategy for denying ID undermines this
approach and would count many citizens’ deepest spiritual beliefs as
unreasonable.
Thus, while it is not true that every PRL would accept that a
belief in an activist God is reasonable, many (I would argue including
Rawls) would do so.20 On this view, what makes a citizen reasonable
is not primarily the plausibility of their belief system. Instead it is
whether they accept the burdens of judgment and value their fellow
19 E.g. Kelly and McPherson, Op Cit.
20 Note that Rawls writes that we should draw the boundaries of the reasonable as loosely as is
possible, and that we should count as reasonable doctrines ‘we could not seriously entertain for
ourselves’ in Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, (New York: Columbia Press, 2005), p. 59.
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citizens as free and equal. Steven Lecce expresses the political variant
writing, ‘Philosophical enlightenment should not be a precondition
of moral status in a society founded on the idea of the social con-
tract’.21 On the political view a belief in a God who intervenes
directly in the world seems clearly to be a reasonable one. It is a
belief held by a very large number of citizens, many of whom are
reasoning in good faith and who do not seem to be fundamentally
opposed to the liberal project.
Therefore, to even potentially sustain NP, a PRL must define
‘reasonable persons’ in terms of primarily political not epistemic
criteria. If they do this, then they must count a believer in an activist
God as reasonable. The question then becomes whether such a
citizen could have reasonable grounds to reject a policy of teaching
only DT. In my discussions of premises 4 and 5 I demonstrate that
they can.
B. Premise 4: Why ID is Constitutive of Some Reasonable Beliefs
In the above discussion, I showed that PRLs seem bound to accept
that at least the religious belief in an activist God is a reasonable one.
However, they might still claim that the specific claims that make up
ID are unreasonable. To take this approach is to argue that one can
separate a citizen’s core theological beliefs (in an activist God) from
the more peripheral beliefs about the creation of life. Following this,
it would be possible to claim that the former set of beliefs are
reasonable even though the latter are not. This would have the
following application in practice. Courts could claim that they took
no view at all on the core questions of religious truth. Thus, the law
forbidding the teaching of ID takes no view at all on the question of
whether there is a God and whether He intervenes in the world. All
that the court takes issue with is the specific views about evolution.
Believers in ID could not, per this argument, suggest that the law
was justified in a way incompatible with their deepest beliefs but only
with a more peripheral part of their belief set.
In response to this argument, I will suggest it is extremely
problematic to separate the belief in an activist God from the belief
in ID. In the minds of some believers, ID represents one of the most
21 Steven Lecce, Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality, (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2008), p. 173.
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important acts of God. Further, I will show that their belief in ID is
not irrational given their belief in an activist God. For such believers,
ID is a core and constitutive part of their comprehensive doctrine. By
this I mean that while other Christians fully accept evolution, we
should count these other Christians as holding a different compre-
hensive view from those who believe in ID. Forcing the children of
believers of ID to learn DT thus does entail teaching children a
different comprehensive doctrine from the one held by their par-
ents.22
The importance of ID to the believer can be evidenced in part the
lengths to which they have gone to resist the teaching of DT, right
up to fighting the case in Kitzmiller. The long running and still
ongoing struggle some believers make to the teaching of science is
sufficient to show that at least they believe that some elements of
mainstream science are incompatible with their religious view. De-
spite this, one could dismiss these beliefs about ID on the grounds
that these people misunderstand the implications of their own faith.
Rawls and most other PRLs (including convergence PRLS) allow
justifications that assume away objections based on clearly erroneous
or mistaken reasoning.23 This is why I suggested that their view of
reasonableness was primarily, not wholly, political. It does have
epistemic elements, but the epistemic criterion is just to reason
adequately from one’s own belief system, it is not a criterion that
subjects theological beliefs to epistemic scrutiny. However, I believe
given the belief in an activist God, a person reasoning adequately
could come to believe in ID. This matters because if they were
making an obvious error about the implications of their own belief
system then their concerns might be dismissed, but since they are
not, either PRLs must impugn their core religious views (which I
argued above they would not) or they must accept that a belief in ID
is reasonable.
My argument here echoes a claim made by Nagel who writes
that:
ID (as I shall call it, in conformity to current usage) is best interpreted not as an argument for the
existence of God, but as a claim about what it is reasonable to believe about biological evolution
22 There are complex questions raised by remarks about counting two Christian doctrines as dif-
ferent views, but note that it is morally problematic to teach Catholicism to the children of Protestant
parents.
23 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 55–58. Also see Gaus’ on ‘modest idealization’, The Order of
Public Reason, p. 276.
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if one independently holds a belief in God that is consistent both with the empirical facts about
nature that have been established by observation, and with the acceptance of general standards
of scientific evidence.24
One way of thinking about Nagel’s argument here would be to make
a distinction between two ways of thinking about the claim that
‘people are justified in believing ID’.
(i) Strong ID thesis whatever their starting point, individuals have good
reason to accept that an outside actor intervened in the creation of life.
(ii) Weak ID thesis If we assume and hold fixed certain religious commit-
ments then individuals have good reason to accept that an outside
actor intervened in the creation of life.
My claim that ID is reasonable for the purposes of PRL requires only
that the weaker thesis is true. To see why it is consider this analo-
gous case:
Bolt from the blue: Imagine that John sees a lightning bolt in the sky
on a day with predominantly clear blue skies. Further, suppose it
turns out that this lightning bolt hit a member of the public, Ulysses.
Going to his local meteorologist, John discovers that there is in fact a
scientific explanation of the event but it is highly unlikely. The sci-
entist suggests that the type of event described has a probability so
low that it would be expected only once in one million years. De-
spite these long odds, if John is an atheist it would still seem rational
to accept that he had witnessed an incredibly rare natural event and
that Ulysses has been spectacularly unlucky. However, now assume
that John is a believer in the ancient Greek gods. Specifically, he
believes that Zeus exists and that he is prone to unleash lightning
bolts on the unworthy. Finally, suppose that Ulysses had knowingly
stolen a sacred calf.
I believe that if we hold fixed John’s belief in Zeus then from his
perspective the best explanation of these events is that Zeus caused
the lightning bolt to hit Ulysses. It does not follow from this argu-
ment that it is fully rational for John to accept this religious expla-
nation, and certainly not that other citizens should accept this
conclusion because of his testimony. Many citizens would think that
this lightning bolt does not constitute any ‘evidence’ for the exis-
tence of Zeus at all. The point of this example is that our problem
with John’s religious explanation is in the assumption that there is a
24 Nagel, ‘Public Education and Intelligent Design’, p. 188.
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super-powered being called Zeus, not with the peripheral belief
about how Zeus might act towards Ulysses.
In the case of ID, if a person believes in a certain kind of activist
God then it seems entirely sensible to accept the proposition that He
was active in the creation of life. Opponents of ID might complain
that there is evidence that no creator was required in the creation of
life, but presumably it would always be true that any set of evidence
is at least consistent with the action of an all-powerful creator. Of
course, just as in the case of Zeus raised above, citizens can have
very good reasons to reject ID. The point is not to show that other
citizens should abandon their objections to ID. Instead the example
demonstrates that the objections of other citizens to ID will, at least
in part, be to the core aspects of the believer in ID’s religious belief.
Since I have shown earlier that this core belief must be considered
reasonable from a political point of view, it follows that the specific
beliefs must be counted as reasonable as well, since they are rea-
soned adequately from a reasonable view.
I have now demonstrated that that on the views of those PRL
who are the target of this paper a belief in ID is, at least in principle,
a reasonable one. In well-ordered liberal societies we should expect
wide disagreement over the existence and nature of God. One of the
beliefs we should expect to be present is a belief in an interventionist
and activist God. Given a belief in a God of this kind, a reasonable
citizen who is reasoning adequately could come to the belief that ID
is the best explanation of life, and this belief could form a core part of
their comprehensive beliefs.25
C. Premise 5: Can proponents of Intelligent Design reasonably be
expected to accept the teaching of evolution?
The above sections have shown both that a belief in ID can be
reasonable, and that it can form a core part of a person’s compre-
hensive doctrines. Together, these premises show that if a believer in
ID can reasonably reject a policy of only teaching DT then such a
policy will be ruled illegitimate by PRL. In this section I show that
25 Joseph Heath has considered cases of this kind in the context of political liberalism. Discussing the
religious belief in reincarnation, and the implication that people can be responsible for their natural
endowments he writes ‘while this worldview may not be scientific, it clearly belongs to a ‘reasonable’
comprehensive doctrine in Rawls’ sense of the term’. See Heath, ‘Political Egalitarianism’, Social Theory
and Practice, 34 (2008), p. 501.
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such believers can indeed make such a reasonable rejection. I take for
granted that a citizen can reasonably reject a law which is premised
on a rejection of her comprehensive view, my arguments show why
teaching only DT constitutes a rejection of some reasonable com-
prehensive beliefs.
In the terminology of PRL, I will argue that the position taken by
the court in Kitzmiller was not ‘freestanding’ from the underlying
metaphysical debates. Rather, the decision was deeply enmeshed in
metaphysical issues. To show this, consider what it would mean for
a policy to be freestanding from comprehensive debates between
reasonable citizens. I suggest that a good way of assessing whether a
policy is freestanding is to ask whether it could plausibly be held by a
reasonable citizen no matter what their comprehensive doctrine. If it
could, then it is properly freestanding. On the other hand, if we can
only reasonably expect someone to support this policy if they hold a
specific comprehensive doctrine, or if they do not hold one specific
comprehensive belief, then the justification for the policy is not
freestanding in the right way.
Consider a distributive principle such as the sufficiency principle.
This principle holds that it is a basic requirement of justice that all
have enough resources to live a reasonably good life. The state must
ensure that all citizens have access to housing, education and
healthcare, and that all citizens either have access to employment
opportunities or are directly provided money by the benefits system.
Now suppose that you meet someone who believes that the suffi-
ciency principle is indeed a requirement of justice. Ask yourself what
knowing that they endorse the sufficiency principle tells you about
their core metaphysical or theological beliefs. The answer is ‘very
little’. After all, the sufficiency principle might be justified in a variety
of different ways. Some people might accept the sufficiency principle
because they believe that God requires that no one is left with too
few resources to live a decent life. Others might believe that the
sufficiency principle maximises welfare. Still others might accept the
sufficiency principle for purely pragmatic reasons, believing that the
stability of the state would be threatened by the presence of large
numbers of impoverished people. The sufficiency principle thus
seems appropriately modular, it is something that could be accepted
by someone holding essentially any comprehensive doctrine.
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In contrast, consider the ID debate. Imagine someone who be-
lieves that schools should teach only ID (or indeed Creationism) then
consider what this political belief tells you about their metaphysical
commitments. They are extremely suggestive of the fact that they
believe in a literalist view of the bible. This is not certain; perhaps
they believe schools should teach Creationism for some other rea-
son. They might believe that children who are taught Creationism as
part of a Christian upbringing are likely to grow up into better
democratic citizens. Nevertheless, this belief seems strongly predic-
tive of having a certain comprehensive view (and I confidently assert
that most people who support teaching Creationism or ID do in fact
hold a religious comprehensive view).
Importantly, many liberal thinkers share my judgement about this
matter. They believe that teaching ID or creationism is tantamount
to state endorsement of a religious comprehensive view. Amy
Gutmann argues that ‘teaching creationism as science – even as one
of among many reasonable scientific theories – violates the principle
of non-repression in indirectly imposing a sectarian religious view on
all children’.26 For Gutmann, the mere fact that there might be some
grounds of public reason to support creationism are not sufficient to
count teaching ID as a neutral policy. She believes that citizens who
do not share these religious sectarian beliefs can reasonably reject
teaching ID.27
The situation is more complex when we consider someone who
believes that schools should teach only DT. The reason is that it is
entirely possible to be both a devout religious believer and a believer
in evolution. DT is thus considerably more ecumenical than is ID or
creationism. Therefore, it might seem that a policy of teaching only
DT is suitably freestanding, because teaching DT is compatible with
the views of atheists and of devout believers it does not seem to
press any sectarian view.
An argument of this kind is suggested by the court in Kitzmiller.
The judge wrote that:
‘Both defendants and many of the leading proponents of ID make a bedrock assumption which is
utterly false. Their presupposition is that evolutionary theory is antithetical to a belief in the
26 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education, Rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1999),
p. 102.
27 I discuss creationism in this passage because it is the language Gutmann uses in the quoted
passage (written before ID becomes prominent), but I believe she and other like-minded liberals would
object to state endorsement of ID for similar reasons.
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existence of a supreme being and to religion in general. Repeatedly in this trial plaintiffs’
scientific experts testified that the theory of evolution represents good science, is overwhelm-
ingly accepted by the scientific community, and that it in no way conflicts with, nor does it deny,
the existence of a divine creator’.28
Here the court claims that because someone could accept both DT
and Christianity teaching DT is an appropriately neutral decision.
However, this conclusion does not follow. While a belief in DT is
indeed compatible with the beliefs of many religious believers, it is
not compatible with the religious beliefs of the proponents of
creationism or ID. After all, their belief is that God’s intervention
throughout the process was a necessary aspect of the creation of life,
whereas the teaching of DT suggests precisely the opposite.
These believers thus can reasonably argue that teaching only DT
is antithetical to their beliefs. And their reasonable objections are
highly significant. PRLs ask whether any reasonable citizen can make
a reasonable complaint. The fact that a majority of reasonable citi-
zens can accept that policy is, in this context, irrelevant. Consider an
analogous case, in which the state had a policy that promoted
teaching the view that there was only one God. One could claim this
policy was not sectarian because it was compatible with a whole
range of monotheistic faith including Christianity, Judaism and Is-
lam. Numerically, this range of faiths covers a large majority of the
comprehensive beliefs in the contemporary United States. While
true, this clearly does not make the decision to teach monotheism
appropriately public because there are many reasonable doctrines
with which it conflicts. A Hindu citizen would have patently rea-
sonable grounds to reject such a curriculum. Similarly, while there
are many devout Christians whose beliefs are entirely compatible
with a belief in evolution, this does not make the decision to teach
DT neutral with respect to those whose spiritual beliefs include the
view that God directly created life on Earth.
The mere fact that there is a way to remain ‘Christian’ in some
sense does not seem to assuage the fact that society is using the
school system to promote a specific religious conception which is
not held by some citizens. This concern is expressed by Eammon
Callan who considers the political requirements of Rawls’ view from
the perspective of citizens of faith. He writes:
28 Kitzmiller, p. 136.
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The education they want for their children is one that perpetuates a way of life in the particular
form they cherish. The fact that reasonableness might cohere with some altered form will not
placate them. Scottish Calvinists of the seventeenth century would be horrified at what many of
their American descendants take to be a Protestant faith. Contemporary religious conservatives
might feel a comparable horror at the prospect of a faith their children could one day have.29
Therefore, the claim that DT is compatible with a belief in God is
not sufficient to show that teaching only DT is freestanding. While it
may well be true that for many people religious belief is entirely
compatible with evolution, for some believers these thing are not
compatible. Because of this, just as Gutmann believes that teaching
ID would amount to a sectarian imposition of a world view she and
others disagree with, so too can these reasonable believers in ID
complain that teaching DT is an imposition of a worldview with
which they disagree. Therefore, I have shown both that there can be
reasonable believers in ID, and that they can have reasonable
objections to teaching only DT. This is sufficient to show that
teaching only DT is illegitimate according to PRL.
VI. POSSIBLE REPLIES
In the final section I consider three possible replies to my argument. I
will suggest that while both are important in other areas of debate,
neither can ground a defence of NP.
A. Instrumental Benefits of DT
The first possible reply draws on the instrumental benefits garnered
by teaching DT rather than ID. Widespread belief in ID might lead
to a distrust of mainstream scientists. Deterioration in scientific
aptitude would be relevant from a political point of view for a
variety of reasons. It might cause a loss in the ability of the economy
to produce certain primary goods such as healthcare, and might
undermine the ability of citizens to reason successfully on public
matters with a scientific component.
The attraction of this reply is that it offers a justification for
teaching only DT that is consistent with the requirements of public
reason. The values of medical advances, social productivity or
democratic citizenship are not ones that depend on holding a certain
29 Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, Oxford Political Theory
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 39.
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conception of the good. Instead, benefits of this kind are things that
all citizens can reasonably be expected to see as a good reason to
pursue a specific policy.
The proposed argument is similar to Rawls’ treatment of the issue
of school prayer. He notes that while a political liberal state must
block a requirement to have school prayer because it would
encourage children to hold a certain religious view, school prayer
might be permissible if it was justified because of public benefits such
as a more productive or engaged citizenry, or because collective
prayer fosters community spirit.30 This shows that PRLs can, per-
haps, accept seemingly sectarian education if the aims are suitably
public.
However, there is a crucial difference between the case of school
prayer and that of teaching DT over ID. The difference is that the
supposed benefits of prayer obtain independently of the truth of
Christianity or any other religion. If it is true that communal prayer
fosters a community spirit, this effect is valuable whether or not God
exists. This is not the case in ID. If believing in DT would advance
scientific understanding or produce medical benefits this is only be-
cause DT is true (or just a better explanation of many phenomena
than is ID).
This difference matters because it means that a position on the
underlying comprehensive debate (whether we ought to believe in
DT or ID) must be part of the premise of the argument. While the
goal of public policy would be appropriately neutral, its justification
would be deeply sectarian. This is sufficient to rule the law as ille-
gitimate, because the public reason constraint applies to the reasons
given to justify a law, not merely that law’s goals. Rawls writes,
‘when the premises (emphasis mine) and conclusions are not
acceptable on due reflection to all parties in disagreement, valid
argument falls short of public justification’.31
Further, note that in many cases the instrumental benefits of
teaching are not considered sufficient to outweigh potential objec-
tions from parents. Suppose that there were instrumental benefits
attached to believing one religion rather than another. Perhaps the
protestant work ethic really does encourage children to try harder
30 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 474.
31 John Rawls and Erin Kelly, Justice as Fairness : A Restatement (Delhi: Universal, 2004), p. 27.
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and get better jobs. This fact taken alone would not be seen as
sufficient to justify a government backed campaign to promote
Protestantism to children of Catholic parents. Instead, a parent’s
moral right to object to a curriculum that is antithetical to their
views is seen as extremely weighty, and thus outweighs (at least
minor) instrumental benefits. If my main arguments are sound, then
parents who believe in ID could suggest that even if it were true that
learning DT had some benefits in terms of job prospects, this would
not be sufficient to show why the state had moral permission to
teach a curriculum that was hostile to their conception of the good.
Therefore, I suggest that the mere fact that a policy aims at some
instrumental benefits is not sufficient to render it legitimate within
PRL. While the aim of teaching DT for the promotion of medicine
and science is legitimate, the arguments used to show why this
policy of would have these benefits are necessarily illegitimate. This
strategy would also explicitly take a view on the relative plausibility
of DT and ID, and thus it does not provide a way of defending NP.
B. Teaching and Truth
Another point worth reflecting on is that school curricula often
includes many elements which are not ‘true’, as according to the best
experts. The versions of economics or physics taught to teenagers
contain many simplifications and in some cases wide divergences
from higher level accounts of the same issues. This matters in the
following sense: above I suggested that the state teaching DT
implicitly suggested that the state accepted that DT was ‘true’. But
given that many aspects of the curricula are not true, this claim looks
implausible. Rather, we might think that the curriculum merely
teaches in a way which is useful to create a certain mode of thinking,
to ‘think like a physicist’.32 If the state does not claim that DT is true
by teaching it in schools, then it might be that objections to its
teaching lose force.
While this issue is pedagogically interesting, I do not think this
observation can save NP. This is because there is a big difference
with teaching simplified versions of physics, as opposed to quantum
physics, and teaching DT rather than ID. In the physics case, the
32 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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school curricula is taught as an approximation of the truth. That is,
there is broad agreement on what counts as the best available the-
ory, and agreement this theory is too complex for kids and thus a
need to teach a somewhat simpler version, or even a version that is
wrong in important respects. In the case of ID, there is deep dis-
agreement on whether it is permissible to appeal to an outside actor
in explaining phenomena. The point is that while many things
taught in schools are not ‘true’, they are believed by relevant experts
as things that children have epistemic reason to believe. Conversely,
believers in ID or creationism would not accept that people have
most reason to believe in DT, because they believe that DT misses
important parts of the causal story. The state teaching DT as
something that children have reason to endorse thus does assert a
proposition to which the believer in ID is deeply opposed, even if the
state does not claim that ID is ‘true’.33
C. A Theological Mistake?
A final reply worth considering relies on the argument that believers
in creationism or ID are in some fundamental sense mistaken about
the implications of their own belief system. In the philosophical
literature, this response is explored by Warnick and Fooce who
argue that current, modern understandings of religious texts – in
particular, the Bible – are based on a faulty method of interpretation.
The modern reading of texts seems to suggest that religious texts
present an actual account of events and are therefore contradictory
to scientific understandings. However, a deeper understanding of the
historical context of religious texts suggests that they should not be
seen in this way. On the modernist view, ‘Genesis is taken to be an
accurate description of an independent event’ and ‘this modernist
reading of Genesis is what compels some believers to see it as an
alternative to evolution’.34
In light of this, Warnick and Fooce argue though that this reading
is inappropriate since sacred texts were written according to pre-
modern standards. They add that, ‘Pre-moderns understood sacred
33 Further, it is also worth noting that unlike the physics case most biologists do believe that
evolution is true, or at least the theory we currently have most reason to endorse. They do not teach
DT as merely a proxy of the best view, but rather an important component of the best view.
34 Bryan R. Warnick and C. David Fooce, ‘Does Teaching Creationism Facilitate Student Auton-
omy?’, Theory and Research in Education 5, no. 3 (2007), p. 366.
PUBLIC REASON, SCIENCE AND FAITH
texts not so much as something which refers to the sacred, but
something which incarnates or enacts the sacred’.35 On this under-
standing, model sacred texts are taken to be more analogous to
poetry than science text books, and are attempts to capture the
significance and emotions of events rather than to depict exactly how
they occurred in the physical world. Hence teaching children the
story of Genesis as literal fact is not (only) bad science, but also bad
theology and fails to instantiate the religious practice in the way its
proponents would presumably wish to do.
But this line of response cannot save NP. If Warnick and Fooce
are correct, then believers who take a literalist interpretation of
Genesis are mistaken about both the correct reading of the Bible and
the right way to understand the creation of life. While this may be
true, it is fairly obviously not a reason that is freestanding from
theological debates.
Interestingly, Matthew Clayton and David Stevens suggest that
sometimes PRLs must make this kind of move. They consider cases
in which religious citizens believe that God commands them to take
actions that are inconsistent with a liberal society. They argue that
the right reaction in this case is for the state to take issue with the
core religious beliefs at stake and they council the liberal state to use
explicitly religious reasons which would presumably include those
discussed by Warnick and Fooce in the case of ID. They write:
Despite Rawls’s attempts to be non-sectarian… political liberals must be committed to rejecting
certain comprehensive claims, at least if and when they confront the liberal view. And, they
must be rejected as false and not as merely reasonable. This is a significant change to the
ordinary portrayal of political liberalism as eschewing any appeal to, or engagement with, the
content of comprehensive conceptions.36
This is an extremely interesting development within PRL, which
as the authors rightly note, represents a major shift from most PRL
discourse. In the context of this paper, the most important thing to
note is that by taking this step Clayton and Stevens abandon NP. The
arguments of Warnick and Fooce, or other theological arguments,
are explicit denials of ID. Admittedly, these arguments come from a
shared theological cannon and might be more acceptable in some
sense to the proponents of ID for this reason. As such, the Warnick
35 Ibid., p. 360.
36 Clayton, Matthew and Stevens, David, ‘When God Commands Disobedience’, Res Publica 20, no.
1 (2014), p. 79.
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and Fooce argument might be a particularly effective form of CP, but
it is explicitly a strategy that confronts ID on its merits rather than
showing why ID can be prohibited while remaining neutral on
religious matters. For this reason, Warnick and Fooce cannot sup-
port an argument like the one deployed by court which purported to
take no view about the plausibility of creationism or ID. Therefore,
whatever the merits of this approach it does not challenge my
central conclusion that NP fails.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has suggested that there is a deep tension between the
ideal of liberal neutrality and the policy of prohibiting the teaching of
intelligent design. This tension matters in practice, since neutrality is
held to be significant in justifying the use of coercive force to parents
of religious faith. If the neutral prohibition strategy succeeds, the
state can justify banning intelligent design in a way that does not
conflict with the religious commitments of its citizens. On this ac-
count, the parent’s objections are misguided and can be properly
ignored. In contrast, this paper has suggested that parents rightly
claim that teaching evolution undermines core aspects of their faith.
Even though some citizens of faith can reconcile a belief in God with
a belief in evolution, this does not imply that a secular scientific
curriculum is justifiable to those whose religious commitments
cannot be reconciled with Darwinian theory.
A broader conclusion of the paper is that liberals cannot help
themselves, as Barry did, to mainstream scientific opinion as an
unproblematically neutral starting point for discussion without fur-
ther argument. As history has repeatedly shown, scientific conclu-
sions can be deeply controversial with religious citizens. This has
potential implications for a number of ongoing political debates in
which left liberals appeal to science as a neutral arbiter, for instance
debates over abortion and the use of stem cells. My own belief is that
the scientific view does indeed represent the best basis for the cur-
riculum and for public policy, but this paper has suggested that using
it might require changing or weakening the liberal commitment to
neutrality. In this way, the paper forms part of a growing set of
arguments that suggest that the commitment to neutrality imagined
by PRLs might too demanding, and that while a limited form of
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neutrality may be applicable, the state must sometimes take sides on
disputed questions of value and of metaphysics.37 I have demon-
strated that an important set of cases for neutrality are those, like ID,
when the disagreement is not merely about value. Further work on
the substance of different religions is required to properly explore
these further questions, but this paper demonstrates that taking all
‘comprehensive beliefs’ or conceptions of the good to be structurally
similar is not be the best way to proceed with the required analysis.
Religions are very different from merely ethical theories, and taking
them seriously requires acknowledging this.
OPEN ACCESS
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons At-
tribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
indicate if changes were made.
University of Bristol, 11 Priory Rd, Clifton, Bristol, BS8 1TU, UK
E-mail: tim.fowler@bristol.ac.uk
37 For other arguments of this form see Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), especially chapter 8 and Alan Patten, ‘Liberal neutrality: A reinterpretation and a defence’,
The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, pp. 245–272.
TIM FOWLER
